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Abstract 
Among the scholars who studied Confucianism in Edo period Japan there were 
those who devoted their time particularly to the study of Confucian ethics. Itô 
Jinsai is most often considered as an intermediary between the ideas of the Zhu 
Xi School, of which he was a critic, and the Sorai School, which in many ways 
he helped inspire, but also as a proper Confucian ethicist. As interpreting 
Confucian ethics within the field of comparative philosophy has come a long 
way recently, I would like to examine Jinsai’s project through the prism of some 
of the newest proposed readings. 
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要旨 
江戸時代の日本において儒学を研究した学者の中には、特に儒学道徳に多
くの時間を割いた者がいる。なかでも伊藤仁斎は、朱子学を批判し、徂徠
学派に影響を与えながらも、両者の思想を結びつけた者として有名である。
彼は本義的に儒学道徳者であった。昨今、比較哲学の分野における儒学道
徳の研究も少なからず行われるようになってきたが、本論文は最新の研究
書を参照しながら伊藤仁斎の思想を考察する。 
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1. Research project outline 
 
My research concerns the teachings of the Edo period 江戸  (1600-1867) 
Japanese scholar, Itô Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 (1627-1705) whose works are usually 
studied in the context of that which came before—the work of scholars who 
followed what Maruyama Masao describes as the Zhu Xi1  mode of thought 
(Maruyama 1974: 19-68)—and that which came after him—a dissolution of the 
Zhu Xi mode of thought 2 , most famously exemplified by the teachings of 
another Edo period teacher, Ogyû Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666-1728). Though such 
interpretations of Jinsai’s place in the intellectual history of Edo period Japan 
may seem somewhat simplified and often even ideologically suspect, it can 
easily be said that Jinsai was indeed a critical student of the Zhu Xi School of 
Structural Principle 理学, as well as a scholar who went against the mainstream 
academic currents of his time3.   
 
The intellectual history of the Edo period of Japan has been well studied, both 
by Japanese as well as by non-Japanese scholars4 . The vibrant intellectual 
culture of the time left a deep mark on Japanese society and can be studied 
from myriad angles. Needless to say, many of its great names were concerned 
with the study of Confucian ideology, which found its expression in a variety 
of forms. Confucianism is known to have had a great resurgence in Japan of 
the time, acting as the ruling Shogunate’s official ideology, but also as having 
a much broader impact than just this. The interpretation that was brought from 
Korea and held in the highest regard at the beginning of the Edo period was 
that of the famous Song Dynasty Chinese scholar Zhu Xi. Many famous 
Japanese scholars, such as Hayashi Razan 林羅山 (1583-1657) the founder of 
Hayashi University and Yamazaki Ansai 山崎闇斎  (1619-1682) generally 
considered to have represented the Zhu Xi orthodoxy, tried more or less 
faithfully to follow Zhu Xi’s teachings; but it also did not take long before 
critical readings of Zhu Xi’s works appeared as well.  
 
One of the scholars most directly engaged in the criticism of Zhu Xi’s School of 
Structural Principle was Itô Jinsai. Primarily occupied with trying to further the 
proper understanding of Confucian ethics—being very passionate in his study of 
both the Analects論語 and the Mencius 孟子 as well as the works of Zhu Xi and 
other Confucian scholars—Jinsai tried to point out ways in which he believed 
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Confucian teachings had been corrupted by the heterodox influences of 
Buddhism and Daoism and tried to steer scholars back in the direction of 
reading the ancient works for themselves. As Confucianism itself is a tradition 
that has always been interested in the question of ethics, the study of the ethical 
principles of Confucianism also flourished in Edo period Japan—again finding 
many different expressions, representing the teachings of different scholars who 
in fact differed both in their methodologies and in many of their core concepts, 
as well as in their views on proper Confucian study and conduct. 
 
Jinsai’s work, as mentioned, can be seen as a project of rejecting Zhu Xi’s key 
notions, considered by Jinsai to be too life-denying and corrupted by 
influences that he did not believe followed Confucius’ 孔子 (551BC–479BC) 
teachings—especially the all-encompassing notion of the structural principle 
理 (De Bary 2005: 205, 206). But, as John Allen Tucker notes, Jinsai’s work 
can also be seen as a critical development of Zhu Xi’s ideas that follows the 
path already begun in other works, such as Chen Beixi’s陳北溪 (1156-1223) 
Seiri jigi 性理字義—a view by which, working within the genre of Confucian 
lexicography, Jinsai did not in fact outright reject the Zhu Xi doctrine but 
merely took the next step in its development (Tucker 1998: 18-29). Though 
Tucker’s reading, namely that Jinsai’s critical views originate from the fact 
that he was himself a Kyoto chônin 町人 who developed his thought 
diametrically opposite to the more prevalent versions of Confucian ethics of 
the time inspired by the life of the samurai, again seems a bit simplistic in the 
light of Jinsai’s own well thought out intellectual goals, the view that Jinsai 
does not offer a definite refutation of Zhu Xi’s views but rather a certain shift 
of emphasis is also quite plausible. 
 
In any case, Jinsai is considered to be a critic or a critical student of the Zhu Xi 
School—with the main points of his works turning away from the expansive 
metaphysics of the Zhu Xi model, turning away from the emphasis on 
discussions of structural principle 理 and turning towards the generative force 
氣—away from the abstract and towards the practical; towards discussing 
people’s natural tendencies 性 in terms of feelings 情 instead of the structural 
principle 理, and as seeing the way of humanity 人道 as fundamentally separate 
from the way of heaven 天道. In studying Jinsai’s treatment of these notions 
both his agreements and disagreements with Zhu Xi can be well appreciated. 
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So, how far does Jinsai’s own professed project need to be taken into account? 
In his key works Jinsai shows no sign of being interested in the ideological or 
political questions of the day—being a professional scholar who declined any 
official position and who also passed through many doctrines before settling on 
Ancient Confucianism as being the right one for him—and his own chosen work 
was in establishing the philological lineage of Confucian ideas: to distinguish 
such ideas from other, heterodox ideas, which supposedly crept into the 
teachings of Chinese schools in the Song dynasty宋 (960–1867). Although his 
work can in many ways generally be considered a rejection of the Tokugawa 
academic mainstream, it can also be studied more directly from the point of 
view of its philosophical content—that is to say, allowed to become a relevant 
discussion on Confucian ethics. 
 
Working within the genre of Confucian lexicography, Jinsai engages in a 
thorough conceptual analysis of Confucian notions from the point of view 
not merely of scriptural fidelity, but primarily of what he sees as proper 
Confucian ethical theory—by implication leading to proper Confucian 
practical conduct. Coming at the end of a powerful religious re-examination 
of Confucianism—in the form of the Song 宋  (960–1867) and Ming 明 
(1368–1644) dynasties Chinese schools of thought, such as those of Zhu Xi 
and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1427–1529)—and explicitly aimed at steering 
scholarly attention back to the original teachings of Confucius and Mencius
孟子 (372BC–289BC), Jinsai’s work is characterized by a rigorous study of 
the ancient notions and can, according to Huang Chun-chieh, be considered 
as a type of Confucian hermeneutics in East Asia (Huang 2008: 247). 
 
John Allen Tucker points out:  
 
However else Jinsai’s Gomô jigi might be understood, it is surely 
describable as a text evincing a passionate devotion (philo) to 
sagely learning and moral wisdom (sophos). By implication it 
seems that Jinsai merits recognition as one of Tokugawa Japan’s 
early modern philosophers. (Tucker 1998: 53)  
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In his works Jinsai himself seems primarily interested in Confucian ethics: in 
the nature of man and his place in the world between Heaven and Earth, not 
only as taught by Confucius and Mencius, but as Jinsai himself was convinced 
represented the one true and timeless way. Jinsai’s works can therefore be read 
in the manner that he himself seems to have intended: as a thorough study of 
Confucian ethics through which he intended to elucidate the way 道 itself. 
 
As Confucian ethics are today much studied by philosophers, and exciting 
new readings of the ancient ideas are being offered, commentaries such as 
the Gomô jigi 語孟字義, the Dôjimon 童子問 and the Rongo kogi 論語古義, 
which offer a thorough re-examination of Confucian teachings as well as an 
outside cultural point of view, seem to be a fruitful ground to revisit— 
we would do well to re-examine Jinsai’s work through the lens of present-
day comparative philosophy. 
2. Research question and its relevance 
 
As comparative philosophy grows ever more careful of how it approaches 
certain traditions, new study methods and new readings of old teachings  
are being proposed.  
 
I would like to study Jinsai through the prism of some of the latest proposed 
readings, firstly to offer an updated look into Jinsai’s relationship with 
Confucian ethics, and secondly, to try to determine in what way particular 
concepts presented by Jinsai fit into present-day philosophical research into 
said ethics. Can Jinsai’s teachings offer certain important insights into 
concepts that today are being explored by philosophers primarily through the 
lens of Confucian ethics? Can they—having grown out of studying classical 
Confucian texts but developed within the cultural context of Edo period 
Japan—in some way help to illuminate important aspects of Confucian 
teachings and offer further insights into concepts that comparative philosophy 
is trying to understand through the study of Confucian ideas? 
 
As Confucian teachings in general, and Jinsai’s interpretation in particular, 
cannot be transcribed onto the European philosophical tradition in a simple 
manner, a variety of comparative approaches have been tried in the past. My 
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own approach centers on trying to see Jinsai’s work through the prism of 
different modern interpretations, trying to combine insights into both the 
hermeneutical and the ethical nature of Jinsai’s teachings and Confucian 
tradition in general, as well as coming to terms with elements of the theory of 
embodied knowledge which could also be shown to be very relevant to Jinsai’s 
project. It would seem the breadth of Confucian teachings warrants such a 
broad and, perhaps, at first glance, scattered approach—as simple comparisons 
do not seem to offer good enough results. 
 
A fairly recent interpretation of Confucian ethics has been proposed by 
Henry Rosemont Jr. and Roger Ames, who argue that classical Confucianism 
must be considered a sui generis ethical system: a kind of role ethics 5 .  
I would also like to try and read Jinsai’s work through the prism of this 
proposed interpretation—or at the very least through some of its key points—
so as to establish whether such a reading might be appropriate for 
interpreting Jinsai’s teachings or whether Jinsai’s work falls outside of it—
and if this is the case, whether it is because Jinsai diverges from Confucian 
ethics in some key points or if such proposed readings are themselves simply 
too narrow to encompass the different branches of Confucian ethics.  
 
Also, if Confucian role ethics are not the proper interpretation of Jinsai’s 
ethical system, can such readings still offer a prism through which his works 
might in some way be examined? Even if the answers presented in the 
Confucian-role-ethics interpretation do not wholly agree with Jinsai’s project, 
the questions raised by Rosemont and Ames seem important and must be 
asked about Jinsai’s teachings as well: questions into the nature of language, 
into family and familial roles, questions into the nature of hierarchies, and—as 
I hope to show—most importantly, the question of the body-self as opposed to 
the abstract individual self which can in many ways be considered the basis of 
all the main European ethical traditions. 
 
Furthermore, I would like to study Jinsai’s thought from the point of view of 
his own methodology. In this sense Huang, quoting Koyasu Nobukuni, shows 
how Jinsai eschewed the highly abstract terminology of the Cheng-Zhu school 
for a different approach: studying the words of Confucius and Mencius both in  
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an intertextual as well as an intratextual manner (Huang 2008: 251), and trying 
to demonstrate their overall coherence. Such an approach was bound to 
produce different, though no less interesting, results. 
3. Theoretical framework and methodology 
 
I primarily follow the methodology of comparative philosophy, keeping in 
mind that the comparison does not only occur at the conceptual level but at the 
categorical level as well. I also pay my dues to the strict contextual demands 
of the study of intellectual history. It should be pointed out that Jinsai’s 
teachings have previously been discussed from the point of view of western 
philosophical categories, as well as from the point of view of Confucian 
categories, but as the methods of comparative ethics grow more and more 
aware of the difficulties of unbiased research and philosophy hones its 
concepts, interesting new perspectives arise. That said, there are certain 
methodological elements that must be considered. 
 
The different texts should be read in their original form and comparative 
methods carried out with special care for differing and shifting contexts. 
Following Jinsai’s own methods of research, there must also be a clear 
understanding of both the meaning and the semantic lineage 意味血脈  of 
ideas—that is, the intellectual history of the ideas being discussed; to not try 
and force one set of categories over another, but to engage in respectful and 
constructive comparison. It is imperative that all these distinctions be kept 
clear and that they be reflected throughout. It may also be noted that a specific 
study of language plays a key role in Jinsai’s own research method (as 
described for example in Yoshikawa and Shimizu 1971: 73-79)6, as well as in 
how modern comparative ethicists argue for certain aspects of Confucian role 
ethics (see for example Rosemont 2015: 25-28). 
 
The scope of the research should aim to mirror the extent to which certain 
forms of Confucian thought pertain to Jinsai’s own teachings. It must be 
chosen carefully, so that there can be minimal doubt as to whether the findings 
are relevant. In the same vein, the concepts found in present day philosophical 
discourse should also be considered carefully before used for comparison and 
demonstration. As I am trying to engage in concept comparison from the point 
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of view of the present-day philosophical study of Confucian ethics, the scope 
might necessarily at some points be broader and at some points be narrower 
than that of the established research of Jinsai’s works. 
 
Thirdly, there is the specific context of Jinsai’s own project. His approach was 
to study Confucian ideas—both their meaning and their lineage—and to arrive 
at a proper understanding (Yoshikawa and Shimizu 1971: 73-79.). As already 
noted, proper understanding for Jinsai did not merely mean proper reading of 
the scripture, but was rather shown in proper everyday conduct and attitude. It 
can be argued that Jinsai never truly managed to recover the teachings of 
Confucius and Mencius—that he instead offered an interpretation of those 
teachings with its own specific conceptual peculiarities—but his professed 
project cannot be completely ignored as his own underlying motivation, nor 
can we ignore how his project plays into the general hermeneutical nature of 
the Confucian tradition7. A study of these specific points should allow me to 
further explicate aspects of Jinsai’s own work — especially what he himself 
considered to be the meaning behind his work and how much bearing this had 
on his methods. 
 
Therefore, I would like to access Jinsai’s project from the point of view of his 
own conceptual analysis—to engage with his ethical thought and to show how 
Jinsai actually offered an interpretation of Confucian ethics that can be 
illuminating even to comparative philosophers engaged in the study of 
Confucian ethics today. My plan is to delve into Jinsai’s notions directly and 
to show how a relative ‘change of emphasis’ could very well be considered a 
‘rejection of a system of thought’ when the relationship between theory and 
practice in Confucian traditions as well as Jinsai’s own attitudes are carefully 
considered. Even though Jinsai might have developed Zhu Xi’s ethics in a 
certain way instead of breaking with them, his concepts are actually far more 
deeply rooted in the concrete, the mundane and the secular, and therefore help 
to illuminate very different aspects of Confucian ethics than those of Zhu Xi, 
all of which brings Jinsai to a largely different vision of proper Confucian life.  
 
Next, I would like to try to determine if Jinsai can be read from the point of 
view of Confucian role ethics—or at the very least if his teachings possess 
some of the characteristics proposed in that reading. Confucian role ethics start 
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by saying that an abstract rational individual does not comprise the basis of 
Confucian ethical discourse (Rosemont 2015: 33-53)—that the self is 
fundamentally a sliding and shifting image, a combination of the roles one 
plays—for example in the family in which they are first defined—and goes on 
to thoroughly inhabit (ibid.). This last part is also extremely important for the 
understanding of Confucian ethics: the roles one inhabits are not an act—they 
represent a proper, albeit shifting, identity. As Confucian role ethics offer an 
interesting possible interpretation of Confucian ethics, I consider them an 
important interpretative reference for my research—while also being careful 
not to approach Jinsai’s teaching with prejudice. I believe such readings offer 
an important place to start, but I also believe trying to apply this interpretation 
to Jinsai might prove to be less than straightforward and might have some 
unforeseen and interesting effects. 
 
This does not present a problem for my research, but an opportunity. If, as has 
been proposed here, Confucianism is its own sui generis ethical system, then 
such a system may have the scope to accommodate many different and differing 
interpretations—provided they are compatible on certain defining points. I 
intend to show which of Jinsai’s concepts play an important part of the present 
day study of Confucian ethics and which diverge from it more fundamentally—
not to judge the worth of one or the other but simply to point out the potential of 
the development of Confucian ethics along different lines. Examples may range 
from examining the ways in which Jinsai’s concepts of the body-self and its 
ethical dimensions may offer an insight into Confucian filial piety 孝 , or 
demonstrating that a lack of an explicitly complex metaphysical system does not 
in fact mean the lack of complexity in Jinsai’s conception of the world and 
humankind’s place in it. 
 
While the biographies and the history surrounding Jinsai and other scholars 
under review should be taken into account, I do not plan on making any 
special hypotheses concerning how their way of life influenced their works, 
but would rather like their work to primarily speak for itself—only pointing 
out conceptual discrepancies where they arise.  
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4. Hypothesis and preliminary results 
 
My hypothesis begins with accepting that Jinsai’s own project—his criticism 
of the Confucian concepts as developed by Zhu Xi and others—does not in 
fact bring him back to Confucius’ and Mencius’ original teachings. What I 
do think it does, and does very well, is offer a version of Confucian ethics, 
which, while they stand removed from their original cultural context, are 
nevertheless born of Jinsai’s own strenuous efforts to come as close to the 
ethical core of what Confucius and Mencius taught as possible: a hermeneutical 
approach, which in fact mirrors the hermeneutical tendencies of Confucian 
teachings as such. When the ethical elements of this approach are made clear, 
the next step is to try and locate Jinsai’s ideas within the present day study of 
Confucian ethics, especially comparing Jinsai’s readings to that of Confucian 
ethics as a form of role ethics. 
 
Applying the role ethics view to Jinsai’s teachings, the question of the self 
arises naturally. The Confucian role ethics hypothesis, as discussed, goes 
against basing Confucian ethics on any sort of abstract individual self in the 
sense of European ethical traditions. Rather it presents the human experience 
as an ever-shifting array of different roles, which constitute the only real self. 
Such a starting point must thus already be construed as a notable shift in how 
ethical thought is approached and developed. It is interesting that this reading 
can be seen in how Jinsai structures the relationship between the independent 
way 道  and virtues 徳 , both existing outside of the human self, but also 
accepts Mencian theory that the heart-mind 心 is itself structured around the 
four sprouts 四端 of said virtues. The question of whether the way or the 
heart-mind is the primary vessel of virtue does not have a simple answer and is 
a dynamic point of discussion.  
 
Furthermore, when questioned on what might nevertheless stand as the one 
identifying feature of a Confucian role-bearing person across all the different 
roles, Rosemont answers it would probably have to be the notion of the body 
(Rosemont 2015: 52-53). I believe the body can be considered a central 
notion of Jinsai’s own teachings as well—albeit one that at first glance 
interestingly remains quite unreflected upon in his central works.  
Prioritizing generative force 氣 instead of the structural principle 理 
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(Yoshikawa and Shimizu 1971: 14-20) and considering the inborn human 
qualities 性  as belonging to concrete generative force 氣質  (Yoshikawa 
and Shimizu 1971: 48-73), again without connecting them to the concept of 
the structural principle 理 , Jinsai establishes the body-self 身  in his  
own particular manner. 
 
Jinsai in fact spends no time describing the body as such and he does not 
explicitly explore how the body-self functions as a body-self. But from his 
conception of the self—from the point of view of the already noted peculiar 
relationship between inborn qualities 性, the virtues 徳, the way 道, as well as 
the mind-heart 心 and the human feelings 情, one can draw observations on 
the nature of the self and the body in his teachings. It seems very much 
possible to show that the self in Jinsai’s teachings never transcends the body-
self, but that the body-self itself possesses certain dimensions that transcend 
common concepts of the body: such as the ethical, the spiritual, and the 
cultural dimensions into which the body-self extends. 
 
The body is necessarily a different form of self than an abstract individual 
self— it is never abstract, cannot be lifted out of its environments, and has 
certain defined characteristics (one of which is of course also the relat ionship 
it has with the family); the embodied knowledge is of course then also further 
influenced by these factors. The body is important to Confucians as a keepsake 
one receives from one’s parents8, but it is in fact much more than that and my 
hypothesis is that it can be shown to be just as central an idea to Jinsai’s works 
(and perhaps even to Confucian ethics in general) as the family is—that in fact 
the family may actually represent certain primary extensions of the body in its 
cultural and ethical dimensions. 
 
Jinsai follows the Mencian doctrine of the inborn good, just as Zhu Xi, but 
diverges from Zhu Xi’s ideas in that he connects this notion neither with the 
concept of the structural principle 理 nor with the concept of the principle of 
heaven 天理  (Yoshikawa and Shimizu 1971: 49-56). Jinsai always places 
emphasis on the generative force 氣 and its particular manifestations (ibid.). 
Mencius’ good inborn qualities 善性 are just like a person’s four limbs—they 
are something that the body naturally possesses and that it can use to one 
degree or another (Yoshikawa and Shimizu 1971: 54-56); the body possesses 
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the sprouts of its ethical and ritualistic dimensions. Extending the sprouts of 
the heart-mind 心 through learning is the fundamental labor in Jinsai’s 
teachings, what such extending entails in practice is the fundamental question 
of his discussions on ethics.  
 
The family can then be considered to act as the primary environment of such 
extendedness—this itself represented by filial piety 孝—as well as to have 
special ties to the body through the parent/child relationship, which, as noted, 
is so important to Confucianism. Of course special ties to the body are not in 
themselves the prerequisite for extending the ethical-, cultural- and value-
giving dimensions of the body-self, but they cannot, within Confucian norms, 
be disregarded. The nature of ethical knowledge as embodied 9 is also very 
important: there can be no proper ethical knowledge beyond the embodied 
and no proper ethical conduct beyond the conduct of the body-self. This is, in 
a sense, why Jinsai calls the structural principle 理 a dead term and stresses 
that only the way 道 can encompass the myriad expressions of the living 
universe. To him only practice, not abstract principle, can in fact represent 
the way 道 and virtue 徳. 
 
Also important then is Jinsai’s insistence that the body-self (as the 
embodiment of inborn qualities and knowledge) possesses feelings 情 which 
fundamentally move it. Jinsai goes against the strict life-denying qualities of 
what he perceives to be Zhu Xi’s way of thinking and stresses the quality of 
feelings; that desires欲 as such also include the desire for proper conduct. It 
is in some ways an aesthetical tendency which Jinsai likens to the eye’s 
desire for beautiful images or the tongue’s for good food (Yoshikawa and 
Shimizu 1971: 138-139). Of course people desire to not be ashamed—
without this desire and the feeling behind it , what would drive people's 
actions? That feelings as such should be considered as actually set against 
the original good nature seems wrong to Jinsai—what would people’s 
motivation even be without feelings 情 and desires 欲? What would move 
people to do what they do (ibid.)? 
 
And yet Jinsai does not claim that the four beginnings 四端 of Mencius’ good 
nature 善性  are themselves any kind of feelings or emotions—nor are  
they any kind of thought. Jinsai points out Mencius’ own teachings on  
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what people cannot endure and cannot do and categorizes this as a 
fundamental characteristic of the heart-mind 心. Affection for others, a sense 
of shame, a sense of valuing something over something else, and a 
distinction of right and wrong are the workings of the heart-mind, not 
specific thoughts or feelings (Yoshikawa and Shimizu 1971: 56-58). 
Extending these beginnings means thoroughly embodying virtue, extending 
the body from the inborn qualities of one person into the universal way 道—
through learning 学 (Yoshikawa and Shimizu 1971: 72-77)—which can be 
considered the key Confucian project. 
 
The research should show the extent to which these concepts can in fact be 
considered in line with Jinsai’s own ideas and in what ways they might offer 
further insight into Confucian teachings as such. The concepts discussed also 
offer a certain direction in the study of Jinsai’s ideas through the lens of 
Confucian role ethics and other newest philosophical readings of Confucian 
works—and even though some of these interpretations may not be compatible in 
the end, they still seem to offer plenty of topics for fruitful comparative research. 
5. Conclusion 
 
The research should show how the hermeneutical and ethical elements of the 
Confucian tradition are employed in Jinsai’s teachings. It should also show 
how Jinsai’s own project can be studied from the point of view of modern 
comparative philosophy: how elements of the role ethics interpretation as well 
as theories of embodied knowledge can in fact be shown in many aspects of 
Jinsai’s own interpretation of Confucius’ and Mencius’ teachings. Bringing 
these different interpretations together might then be able to further the 
understanding of each individual one. 
 
 
 
                                               
1 After the Chinese scholar Zhu Xi朱子 (1130-1200). 
2 For Maruyama’s study, see Maruyama (1974). 
3 For a recent study of Jinsai’s work by a Japanese scholar see for example Koyasu (2015). For an example of 
non-Japanese scholarship see the introductory study in John Allen Tucker’s translation of the Gomô Jigi 語
孟字義 (Tucker 1998). 
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4 See for example de Bary (2005) or Paramore (2016). 
5 For an introduction to the study of Confucian role ethics, see for example Rosemont (2015). 
6 For the purposes of this study I have summarized Jinsai’s writing in English, but refer the reader to the 
Japanese version in Yoshikawa and Shimizu (1971).  
7 See for example Chan (1984). 
8 See for example the Xiao jing (The Classic of Filial Piety). 
9 Margus Ott presents the link between Confucian tradition and theories of embodied knowledge in Ott (2017). 
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